Panel I - GENERAL DIscUssIoN
Craig Baab:
There really is not anybody here today who does not have either
some prior interest in or knowledge of international human rights
issues. That is good but also part of the problem. It is relative to
the last point that Professor Lillich raised, and I think it is important.
If there is to be an advocacy group, it needs to be other than us
preaching to the choir. We need to go out to the people we would
like to think are involved in this sort of thing, whether it is Fortune
500 companies, groups other than the usual labor or religious groups,
and the others that we are working with right now. If we do not
broaden that base, we are not going to be any more successful than
we are now.
Alfred de Zayas:
A comment on what has been said by Mr. Baab and Mr. Lillich.
In regard to the building of a constituency, it is evident that nothing
in Washington happens without lobbying. In Geneva NGOs actively
and successfully lobby in the Commission on Human Rights. I am
quite surprised that the American NGOs have not been doing as
much to encourage the United States Congress to ratify the Covenants.
Mr. Lillich's second point raised the question of the President's
committment. I think the lack of political will seen in the Reagan
Administration, and thus far in the Bush Administration, can be
changed. I believe President Bush can be approached personally and
I have attempted to do this through a good friend Ambassador
Armando Valladares, Chief of the American Delegation to the Commission on Human Rights. Ambassador Valladares is a person who
has the ear of the President, and he has promised to do his best to
convey this message.
Craig Baab:
Let me be a little bit defensive. There is a bit more activity occurring
than perhaps has been discussed. The fact that more people here are
not aware of it is, I think, evidence enough that we are not doing
something right, and so we accept that. The group of nongovernmental organizations, generally drawn from the religious community,
Amnesty International, and a number of others, including the Amer-
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ican Bar Association, started working on all this in 1983. We began
with a conscious decision that with all these treaties pending we had
to start someplace. We decided to start with the Genocide Convention,
and for only one reason: it was so laden with political and legal
history that if we did not get it out of the way first, it would block
the doorway. We just had to throw the dice and do what we could
to get the Genocide Convention ratified first. If we lost, we were
going to be in serious trouble; but if we won, then all of that political
history, going back to the early 1950s, would have been put behind
us, and we could proceed with the other treaties. We shall see whether
that strategy is going to work, but that is why that decision was
made.
In the last two years, the same groups of people have been meeting
every couple of weeks to work on all of the human rights instruments
pending before the Senate. In particular, Amnesty International has
a major "Ratification Now" program it started about two years ago.
I think that they are now going to try to appeal to a broader section
of the public. It is in part responsive to what is or is not going on
in the Executive Branch.
I would only say that relative to the establishment of political
will, I agree with Professor Lillich that these things happen in incremental steps. Perhaps it is worthwhile to recall that at the beginning
of the Reagan Administration, after a massive political victory by
the Republicans in the United States Senate, an upending of the
political system occurred in this country. Ronald Reagan could have
done no wrong and could have done anything he wanted. Early on,
as was pointed out, there was a major focus on keeping in existence
the Office of Human Rights in the State Department, contrary to
its proposed abolition. When a decision was made to keep it, a
decision was also made to appoint an Assistant Secretary of State
for Human Rights, one who might not be viewed as being the strongest
advocate for human rights. We should not forget that that person
was not confirmed. This happened in an early stage of the Reagan
Administration, when the Republicans controlled the Senate and human rights were, using Assistant Secretary Derian's term, basically
something to be laughed about. Notwithstanding all of this, that
person's nomination was defeated in the Senate. This is simply to
note the ongoing institutionalization of human rights as part of the
government. If we accomplish that and it takes us eight years, that
is a step. All I'm saying is that these things do take some time.
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Doug Donahoe:
My question is fairly simple. Does it make sense to go forward
with this push for the ratification of human rights conventions given
the current reservations? Would this send the wrong signal overseas?
Would it be better to keep up the pressure so some day we might
be able to ratify the Conventions without the reservations?
Richard Lillich:
Of course, simple questions require complex answers. There was
a lot of debate about this from the beginning. One of the major
mistakes of the Carter Administration was to send up the President's
message with all the declarations, understandings, and reservations
attached. The mistake was not their presence, but the Adminstration's
failure to consult with the NGOs before including them. The preparation of the message as an in-house matter taken under the assumption that the human rights community would rally around the
message, the NGOs would not oppose the treaties no matter how
encumbered, and that there was greater support for them in the
Senate than eventually materialized, was a major mistake. It came
as a great shock to Ms. Derian and the Legal Adviser to find that
there was widespread opposition. If you read the book Ratification
of the Human Rights Treaties, the speaker on the Economic, Social,
and Cultural Covenant not only analyzed the Covenant, but other
instruments as well, indicating that he had some serious doubts about
whether it was worthwhile to ratify them with all of the barnacles
attached. Indeed, many people believe that we achieved very little by
ratifying the Genocide Convention in the way we did, merely to have
the symbolic effect that Mr. Baab indicated. Even in 1979, the
Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaties, Mr. Rovine, argued that if one
wanted to achieve ratification of the treaties one must be prepared
to make compromises. The contrary argument was why make concessions at the outset. If you throw in the towel at the beginning
you are going to be pushed around even more.
I have not had the time to discuss all the other reservations, aside
from the ones in the President's message, that have been suggested.
In 1979, Senator Helms proposed another reservation to the effect
that, although the Civil and Political Covenant does not mention
property, the right is enshrined in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration and is part of international human rights law. I am not
supporting or rejecting the Helms proposal at this time. I am just
suggesting that there are very difficult trade-offs involved, and one
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cannot make rational decisions until one looks at the total package.
If one does not make a thorough survey of each of these proposals
to discover which are serious and which are not, one cannot make
a judgment about which to accept as the price for ratification.
I think we went so far on the Genocide Convention as to raise
serious doubts about our good faith in ratifying that treaty. I greatly
credit David Stewart and his colleagues who were able to roll back
some of the proposed reservations to the Torture Convention. However, they did not roll back enough of them. I also should note that
the Genocide and Torture Conventions are criminal treaties. The
other treaties discussed today are basically civil rights ones. We must
address them as civil rights legislation, much as one would civil rights
bills in Congress and civil rights cases before the Supreme Court.
As I indicated, I am not particularly optimistic about whether a
groundswell of support exists for civil rights in the United States at
the present time. Members of the current Supreme Court, led by
Justice Scalia, my good friend and former tennis partner, have attacked the use of international human rights instruments, even as
persuasive evidence in determining constitutional law norms. Professor
Sohn mentioned the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners. The Supreme Court, starting back in the 1940s as
Professor Lockwood has shown in an article he published in 1984,1
has never held international human rights instruments to be selfexecuting treaties. Yet it has referred to documents like the Standard
Minimum Rules, not as customary international law but as guides
to ascertaining constitutional norms. Some people, like Justice Scalia,
want to eliminate even this minimal impact of international human
rights instruments. They do not want human rights instruments to
play any role in the United States jurisprudence. We now have three,
maybe four, justices who have adopted this position. It is frankly
stated in the first footnote in Justice Scalia's opinion in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 2 a recent death penalty case. To me it simply reflects the
lack of enthusiasm for civil rights present throughout our society
today. If I am correct in this view, then one cannot be overly optimistic
about ratification of the two Covenants, much less other human
rights treaties, in the immediate future.

Lockwood, The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 901 (1984).
2 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2975 n.1 (1989).
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Louis B. Sohn:
The basic problem is that we are putting the cart before the horse.
In short, it is only after we ratify a non-self-executing treaty that we,
Congress permitting, enact domestic legislation. It took us two or
three years to do this with the Genocide Treaty. It seems to me that
we should be doing it the other way around. We should send the
legislation through Congress first, then ratify the treaty. If the Senate
adopts the legislation by a two thirds vote, there will be no trouble
with treaty ratification. We have done things like that before. In fact,
that was the preferred solution after the Second World War. The
Food and Agriculture Constitution was adopted that way. After first
adopting the legislation by a two thirds vote of the Senate, people
said there was no reason for it to have even gone through the Senate.
Several other treaties have been dealt with in the same way.
It seems to me that the adoption of legislation first is the better
method. There is no need to worry whether the treaty is self-executing
if the legislation already accomplishes that. Of course, as we have
seen in the Genocide Convention and more recently in the Torture
Convention, the legislation appears to reinterpret the Convention.
However, as Professor Lillich said a few minutes ago, these are
simply interpretations which may be binding on the United States to
some extent, but not on the international level. It is very interesting
that most people fail to look at the enacting legislation. I believe not
one country looked at our enacting legislation on the Genocide Convention. They were satisfied that the United States ratified the treaty
and had enacted some legislation to do so. Only if a case actually
should arise against the United States concerning genocide, which I
hope will never happen, a study of the legislation might be of some
value. It might be used by the alleged offender if the United States
should bring a case against him. The offender might argue that the
case may not be brought because the enacting legislation says something different than the treaty. As I said at the beginning, the crucial
point is to enact the legislation first and then ratify the convention.
It has been suggested that something like this should be done now
with respect to the Law of the Sea treaty.
Craig Baab:
One short point. I agree generally with what both of my colleagues
have said, 1articularly with Professor Lillich regarding this mass of
qualifiers that are added or proposed to be added to treaties. However,
I think that we are now at a time when treaty law generally, and
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human rights treaties in particular, is in the middle of a sea change.
We do not really know where it is going to go. I would note by way
of the incremental progress made to date that the Third Restatement
of Foreign Relations of the United States contains for the first time
a chapter on international human rights law. All of this suggests that
the changes that we are seeing, or will be seeing, in terms of what
international law means and how it is understood domestically, its
applicability both in domestic courts and relative to our relations to
other countries, are substantial compared to the starting point of the
early 1950s. We are out of that initial stage and are moving into
adolescence. It really means that we are moving into a very dangerous
time. Those of us on the other side of the equation, the advocates,
need to be prepared to do some orginal thinking along the lines that
have been suggested here. Regarding the meaning of reservations,
understandings, and declarations, I am not sure that I would share
your view that some of those are simply outrageous and ought to
be intolerable. That reaction is based on those who were on the other
side of the equation early in the 1950s. That is our reaction as much
to those people as it is to the specific legal instrument itself. I am
just saying that we must be prepared to think novelly, creatively,
and thoughtfully if we are going to try to take the meaning of
international human rights into a new era where it really will mean
something in our court decisions and our relations with other countries.

